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PREFAcE
The G-24 Discussion Paper Series is a collection of research papers prepared 
under the UNCTAD Project of Technical Support to the Intergovernmental Group of 
Twenty-Four on International Monetary Affairs and Development (G-24). The G-24 was 
established in 1971 with a view to increasing the analytical capacity and the negotiating 
strength of the developing countries in discussions and negotiations in the international 
financial institutions. The G-24 is the only formal developing-country grouping within 
the IMF and the World Bank. Its meetings are open to all developing countries. 
The G-24 Project, which is administered by UNCTAD’s Division on Globalization 
and Development Strategies, aims at enhancing the understanding of policy makers in 
developing countries of the complex issues in the international monetary and financial 
system, and at raising awareness outside developing countries of the need to introduce 
a development dimension into the discussion of international financial and institutional 
reform. 
The research papers are discussed among experts and policy makers at the meetings 
of the G-24 Technical Group, and provide inputs to the meetings of the G-24 Ministers 
and Deputies in their preparations for negotiations and discussions in the framework of 
the IMF’s International Monetary and Financial Committee (formerly Interim Committee) 
and the Joint IMF/IBRD Development Committee, as well as in other forums. 
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Abstract
The climate policy debate has advanced from science to economics, with a growing focus on creating 
carbon markets and getting the prices right. This is necessary but far from sufficient for an effective 
and equitable response to the climate challenge. While market-oriented forces such as the IMF and 
the World Bank have focused almost exclusively on carbon markets, others, such as the Human 
Development Report and the Stern Review, have emphasized the need for complementary, non-market 
climate initiatives to promote energy conservation and above all, to create and adopt new low-carbon 
technologies.
The equity implications of market-based policies depend on the price elasticity of demand. When 
demand is elastic (i.e. the elasticity is large in absolute value), as in the case of industrial energy use, 
price incentives are quite effective and distributional impacts are minimized. On the other hand, when 
demand is inelastic (i.e. the price elasticity is close to zero), as in the case of transportation fuel use, 
price incentives are less effective, worsening income inequality but doing little to change in energy 
use and carbon emissions. Thus non-market policy instruments are particularly important in sectors 
with inelastic demand for energy, such as transportation.
Price incentives alone cannot be relied on to spark the creation of new low-carbon technologies. 
Many technologies display “learning curve” effects, starting out with high unit costs and becoming 
cheaper as they are used more widely. Wind power, which is now commercially viable, only became 
affordable as a result of decades of government subsidies and research support. The same will be 
true of other low-carbon energy technologies, which will be needed for a sustainable solution to the 
climate problem.
Policy debate has focused on the need for a globally harmonized price for carbon. This is not required 
by economic theory; in an unequal world, the logic of market economics implies that richer countries 
should, in effect, have a higher price for carbon. It appears likely, nonetheless, that a consistent global 
price will eventually be adopted. This will make the benefit of reducing carbon emissions loom larger in 
lower-income countries. As a result, a wider range of carbon-reducing technologies will be profitable 
in developing countries, creating opportunities for “leapfrogging” beyond the technologies in use in 
high-income countries – thereby helping to launch a new, green path to development. ix Carbon Markets and Beyond: The Limited Role of Prices and Taxes in Climate and Development Policy
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I.  Introduction
The good news is that all major voices in the 
climate policy debate, including the Bretton Woods 
institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank), are taking the problem seriously. Skep-
ticism about the science is no longer an option: the 
world’s scientists have never been so unanimous, and 
so ominous, in their projections of future perils. 
The bad news is that for too many participants in 
the debate, including the Bretton Woods institutions, 
climate policy primarily consists of manipulating 
markets and prices. If the only tool you have is 
market liberalization, then every problem looks like 
a question of getting the prices right. But setting a 
price for carbon emissions is only the beginning of 
climate policy, not the end.
The message of this paper for developing 
countries is that it is important to look beyond the 
technical debates over carbon markets. To address the 
threat of climate change, it is necessary to charge a 
price for carbon emissions – and it is also necessary 
for governments to do much more, taking action to 
support innovation and diffusion of new, low-carbon 
technologies. A harmonized global price for carbon 
emissions is not essential as a matter of economic 
theory, but is nonetheless likely to be adopted. This 
will make the opportunities and incentives for innova-
tion even greater in developing countries, creating the 
economic basis for leapfrogging beyond the technolo-
gies adopted in high-income countries.
More specifically, this paper argues that appro-
priate carbon prices and functioning carbon markets 
are necessary but not sufficient. It begins with a 
review of recent publications on climate policy from 
the IMF and the World Bank, contrasting them with 
other recent recommendations. It then examines the 
expected impacts of a higher price of carbon, which 
will be both inequitable and, in some respects, inef-
fective if adopted alone. Turning to more positive 
solutions, the nature of technology, particularly its 
path dependence and learning curve effects, requires 
carefully designed public investments to launch a 
climate-friendly development path. And the impacts 
of carbon prices and markets on developing countries 
create both unique problems, such as proportionally 
greater economic burdens, and unique opportunities, 
in the proportionally greater incentive to innovate and 
establish a new leadership position in 21st century 
technologies.2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 53
II.  The state of the debate
The IMF simply assumes that climate policy 
consists of getting the (carbon) price right:
An effective mitigation policy must be based 
on setting a price path for the greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions that drive climate change 
(IMF, 2008, chapter 4: 2).
Although making an occasional nod to the im-
portance of developments such as hybrid vehicles 
or energy efficiency,1 the IMF’s focus is almost en-
tirely on market instruments. Adaptation to climate 
impacts will, the Fund notes, require large increases 
in infrastructure spending – but much more is said 
about market opportunities for hedging against 
predictable short-term climate fluctuations, through 
weather derivatives and “cat” (catastrophic risk) 
bonds. Mitigation, i.e. emissions reduction, is ad-
dressed primarily through detailed modelling of the 
expected effects of carbon taxes or trading schemes. 
This modelling effort shows that the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will 
be the biggest losers from a moderate carbon price, 
while global trading of emissions allowances will 
probably benefit China above all, due to that country’s 
massive opportunities for comparatively low-cost 
emission reductions.
The IMF analysis sets a target of a 60 per cent 
reduction in carbon emissions, relative to 2002 levels, 
by 2100, in order to stabilize CO2 concentrations 
at 550 parts per million (ppm). This is a signifi-
cant change from business-as-usual, although less 
ambitious than the targets advocated by many govern-
ments and independent analysts; there is a growing 
concern among climate scientists that 450 ppm or 
even lower concentrations may be needed to avoid 
serious risks of catastrophic change. Yet in the IMF’s 
view, the world can move slowly and still reach the 
target comfortably:
Carbon-pricing policies … must establish a 
time horizon for steadily rising carbon prices 
that people and businesses consider believable. 
Increases in world carbon prices need not be 
large – say a $0.01 initial increase in the price 
of a gallon of gasoline that rises by $0.02 every 
three years (IMF, 2008, chapter 4: 42).
Changes in carbon prices of this magnitude are 
dwarfed by recent swings in the price of gasoline, a 
topic discussed in the next section. While it may be 
possible to achieve climate stabilization at moderate 
total cost, considerable ingenuity and new policy 
directions will be required; by themselves, price 
changes of pennies per gallon of gas are not enough 
to achieve anything of importance.
For the World Bank, the success of market based 
policy is already obvious:
The carbon market is the most visible result 
of early regulatory efforts to mitigate climate 
change … Its biggest success so far has been to 
send market signals for the price of mitigating 
carbon emissions. This, in turn, has stimulated 
innovation and carbon abatement worldwide, 
as motivated individuals, communities, com-
panies and governments have cooperated 
to reduce emissions (Capoor and Ambrosi, 
2008: 1).
This success, according to the Bank, is based on 
two major markets for carbon emissions, the EU’s 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) provisions of the 
Kyoto Protocol. They account for about US$ 50 bil-
lion and $13 billion, respectively, of the $64 billion 
in worldwide carbon market transactions in 2007 
(Capoor and Ambrosi, 2008: 1). Both markets, as it 
turns out, are works in progress: the ETS initially 
gave away virtually all emission allowances to ex-
isting emitters, rather than auctioning them – and 
set such a high cap that the price of allowances fell 
embarrassingly close to zero. (Revisions to the ETS 
framework are addressing these design flaws for 
future years.) CDM has been beset by procedural 
delays and complexity, imposing unduly burdensome 
start-up costs. A large majority of CDM funding to 
date has flowed to China, suggesting that CDM does 
not yet provide a truly global mechanism for financ-
ing emission reduction. 
Meanwhile, research sponsored by the World 
Bank has demonstrated that there is substantial 
variation in carbon emissions at the same level of 
development: 
The ranking of countries by emissions intensity 
[i.e., emissions/GDP ratio] … was not system-
atically related to GDP per capita … Emissions 
per capita were positively but only moderately 
correlated with GDP per capita and showed no 
evidence of an eventual decline in emissions 
per capita at higher per capita income (the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve phenomenon; 
Bacon and Bhattacharya, 2007: 2).3 Carbon Markets and Beyond: The Limited Role of Prices and Taxes in Climate and Development Policy
This finding should give rise to curiosity about 
the subtler economic and non-economic determinants 
of emissions. It suggests that growth is not equally 
good, or bad, for carbon emissions in all contexts. 
Therefore, merely speeding up or slowing down eco-
nomic growth may not be the most efficient policy; 
it is also important to understand what differentiates 
high versus low emission countries at the same level 
of economic development. (The same question can 
be asked about states within the United States, which 
differ in carbon emissions per capita by a ratio of 
more than six to one.)
The World Bank’s overall approach to the issue 
sounds multi-faceted, if somewhat abstract. A pro-
posed “strategic framework” (World Bank, 2008) for 
the Bank lists six “pillars,” of which three are focused 
exclusively on market instruments,2 while three are 
more general or ambiguous.3 However, critics have 
claimed that reality falls short of the World Bank’s 
rhetoric. According to a report from the Institute for 
Policy Studies (IPS), an NGO in Washington DC, 
the Bank’s $2 billion in carbon finance projects suf-
fer from an extreme lack of transparency, and have 
resulted in very little confirmed reduction in carbon 
emissions (Redman, 2008). Less than 10 per cent of 
the funding has gone to renewable energy, while 75 per 
cent or more has gone to the coal, chemical, and iron 
and steel industries. In the sponge iron industry in 
India, IPS reports that the incentives for carbon reduc-
tion have been generous enough to cause a perverse 
expansion of the relatively energy-inefficient industry, 
in order to gain additional carbon reduction credits. 
Other voices in the international debate have 
recognized the greater urgency of the problem, and 
have set more detailed reduction targets, such as 
80 per cent reduction in developed countries and 
50 per cent worldwide by 2050, with even greater 
reductions required by 2100. Along with the urgency 
of the issue, there has been a willingness to consider 
a broader range of policy instruments. For the Human 
Development Report (HDR): 
Setting ambitious targets for mitigation is 
an important first step. Translating targets 
into policies is politically more challenging. 
The starting point: putting a price on carbon 
emissions … Carbon markets are a necessary 
condition for the transition to a low-carbon 
economy. They are not a sufficient condition. 
Governments have a critical role to play in 
setting regulatory standards and in supporting 
low-carbon research, development and deploy-
ment (UNDP, 2007, Summary: 20, 21).
HDR calls for carbon markets to be accompa-
nied by government incentives for renewable energy 
production, tightened standards for vehicle fuel ef-
ficiency, expanded research on carbon capture and 
storage technology, and increased technology transfer 
to developing countries. 
One of the most detailed recent proposals is 
Nicholas Stern’s “global deal on climate change” 
(Stern, 2008). Stern argues that climate stabilization 
requires cutting global emissions to half of the 1990 
level by 2050, with continuing declines thereafter. 
The 2050 target is so low – 2 tons per capita, not 
much above the level of emissions today in India, 
and less than half of China’s current emissions – that 
there is virtually no room for any large country to be 
significantly above the average. Stern calls for bind-
ing national reduction targets, to be adopted soon by 
developed countries and the fastest-growing middle-
income countries, and by all other countries by 2020. 
Stern envisions a carbon market, in the form of a 
global cap-and-trade system that allows developing 
countries to sell emission rights, combined with ar-
rangements for technology transfer, and large-scale 
government support for the development of new 
technologies. In the words of his summary,
The world should aim for a liquid international 
carbon market in order to allow for the most 
effective, efficient and equitable emissions 
reductions. In addition, non-price interventions 
are required to expand the global market for 
low-carbon technologies, support common 
standards and promote cost-effective reduced 
deforestation (Stern, 2008: 3).
In short, all major proposals for climate policy 
include a substantial role for carbon markets and 
prices, either in the form of taxes or cap-and-trade 
systems. Yet while the Bretton Woods institutions, 
by their nature and by inclination, give primary 
emphasis to manipulation of prices and financing in 
carbon markets, others, such as Stern and the Human 
Development Report, see carbon markets as one part 
of a complex ensemble of policies. 4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 53
III. What do carbon prices accomplish?
Discussion of carbon markets often highlights 
the distinction between effects on prices and effects 
on emissions. A cap-and-trade system causes a pre-
dictable, explicitly stated reduction in emissions, but 
could lead to unpredictable or fluctuating prices. A 
carbon tax does the opposite, causing a predictable, 
stable effect on prices, at the expense of an uncertain 
reduction in emissions. Those who, like Stern, focus 
on the need to achieve a specific level of emissions 
reduction tend to prefer cap-and-trade markets; those 
who worry more about economic disruption tend 
to prefer the predictable prices achieved by carbon 
taxes. 
This is, however, only one question about the 
effects of carbon markets. A related question has 
received too little attention: when carbon prices are 
increased, by a tax or a trading system, how large is 
the (intended) effect on emissions, and how large is 
the (unintended) effect on income distribution? 
Increased energy costs to consumers fall dispro-
portionately on low-income groups; energy costs are 
a larger fraction of income for the poor. As incomes 
rise, total spending on energy also rises, but more 
slowly; thus the fraction of income spent on energy 
decreases. The one major exception to this pattern 
occurs in countries where some people cannot afford 
fossil fuels, and instead rely on traditional biomass 
fuels. Among the population that buys and depends 
on commercial fuels, energy price increases are 
regressive, taking proportionately more from lower-
income households. 
To summarize in advance the point of this sec-
tion, the effect of a carbon price increase depends 
on the price elasticity of demand for energy. A larger 
elasticity means that a price increase has more effect 
on emissions and less effect on income distribution; a 
smaller elasticity means that the same price increase 
has less effect on emissions, but does more to increase 
inequality.4 Since price elasticities are fairly small 
for energy in general, and extraordinarily small for 
petroleum products in the short run, price incentives 
are a blunt and painful instrument for achieving lower 
emissions.
The price elasticity of demand is, by definition, 
the percentage change in demand that is caused by a 
one per cent change in price. Consider the effects of a 
20 per cent increase in the price of energy at different 
elasticities, as shown in table 1. 
At an elasticity of -1, the 20 per cent increase in 
price causes a 20 per cent drop in demand. Consum-
ers purchase 80 per cent as much energy as before, 
at 120 per cent of the former price per unit, so the 
total cost to consumers amounts to 96 per cent of 
the former total. At this elasticity, most of the effect 
is felt in the change in the quantity of energy (and 
therefore emissions), while total consumer spending 
is little affected. 
In contrast, at an elasticity of -0.05, a 20 per cent 
increase in price causes only a 1 per cent change in 
quantity. Consumers buy 99 per cent as much energy 
as before, at 120 per cent of the former price per unit, 
for a total expenditure of 119 per cent of the earlier 
cost. At this elasticity, there is almost no effect on 
the quantity of energy and emissions, but a large ef-
fect on the total cost to consumers. The other values 
shown in the table have intermediate results between 
these two extremes. Judged as a strategy to reduce 
energy consumption and the resulting emissions 
with minimal burdens on consumers, energy price 
increases seem quite effective at an elasticity of -1, 
but decidedly inferior at an elasticity of -0.05.
What elasticity values are applicable in reality? 
Separate estimates have been developed for major 
energy markets including industrial energy use, 
electricity, and transportation. The largest elasticities 
are found in industry. Estimates from three research 
groups for 15 countries found the price elasticity for 
industrial energy demand to be between -0.77 and 
-0.88. The estimates for India and Brazil were not 
Table 1
IMPAcTS OF A 20 PER cENT INcREASE IN 
ENERGy PRIcES
Price elasticity of demand
-1 -0.5 -0.2 -0.05
Change in quantity
  (per cent) -20 -10 -4 -1
Change in cost to
  consumers (per cent) -4 +8 +15 +195 Carbon Markets and Beyond: The Limited Role of Prices and Taxes in Climate and Development Policy
significantly different from those for the developed 
countries included in the studies (Roy et al., 2006). 
Industrial energy use, in other words, provides fertile 
ground for the application of price incentives for 
emission reduction. Indeed, industry lowered its en-
ergy use much farther and faster than any other sector 
in response to the oil price shocks of the 1970s.
Household demand for electricity is much less 
elastic than industrial energy use. Recent estimates 
for the United States have found a short-run price 
elasticity of -0.20, and a long-run price elasticity 
of -0.32, broadly consistent with earlier research 
(Bernstein and Griffin, 2006).5
This finding of a relatively small elasticity for 
electricity does not appear to be unique to the United 
States; the estimated long-run elasticity for Taiwan 
is -0.16, described as “reasonably close” to the es-
timates in “numerous other studies” (Holtedahl and 
Joutz, 2004: 216). 
In both industrial energy use and electricity gen-
eration, there are alternative fuels that yield the same 
result with differing carbon emissions. An increased 
carbon price would cause a noticeable reduction in 
industrial energy demand (less so in household elec-
tricity), and also a shift toward lower-carbon fuels 
– such as replacing coal with natural gas.
The picture is different in the transportation sec-
tor, where there is essentially only one fuel choice: 
almost all transportation uses petroleum fuels. (On 
a global basis, the available supply of biofuels is too 
small to make a noticeable dent in the demand for 
oil.) In the wake of the oil crises of the 1970s, most 
countries and industries have cut back on oil use 
wherever possible; oil-fired electricity generation, 
once relatively widespread, is now common only in 
OPEC countries. Today a majority of crude oil is used 
for transportation, and a portion of the remainder is 
dedicated to non-fuel uses such as petrochemicals, 
where there are no close substitutes. The connection 
between petroleum and transportation is projected 
to grow even tighter; an estimated two-thirds of 
the growth in oil demand through 2030 will be for 
transportation.6 Thus the oil/transport market is 
almost disjoint from the market for other fuels and 
end uses. 
The lack of alternatives to oil means that in the 
short run, price elasticity is close to zero for many 
consumers. A household that lives in a completely 
automobile-dependent environment – including the 
great majority in the United States, large fractions 
of many OECD countries, and increasing numbers 
in fast-growing, middle-income countries – has little 
control over the amount of driving required to go to 
work, school, stores, and other essential services. So 
in the short run, purchases of gasoline will be quite 
insensitive to price. 
In the long run, as cars are replaced, high oil 
prices stimulate the sale of smaller and more fuel-
efficient vehicles, as began to happen in the United 
States during the price spike of 2007–2008. This 
will eventually affect oil consumption, as the fleet of 
cars on the road slowly becomes more fuel-efficient, 
implying that the price elasticity will be greater in 
the long run than in the short run.
A comparative international analysis estimated oil 
price elasticities for many countries for 1979–2000 
(Cooper, 2003). For the United States, it found a 
short-run elasticity of -0.06 and a long-run elastic-
ity of -0.46, broadly consistent with other published 
estimates. For the G7 group of industrial countries, 
short-run elasticities ranged from -0.024 to -0.071, 
and long-run elasticities from -0.18 to -0.57. Using 
these estimates for the United States, a doubling of 
oil prices causes a 4 per cent reduction in demand 
in the short run, and a 27 per cent reduction in the 
long run.
A study focused specifically on the United 
States gasoline consumption found that the short-run 
price elasticity in 2001–2006 was -0.034 to -0.077, 
lower than estimates for earlier periods (Hughes 
et al., 2006). The data did not permit estimation of 
a long-run elasticity. The authors speculated that 
increasing suburbanization and decreased avail-
ability of mass transit have made it more difficult 
for most households to reduce their automobile use 
today. They concluded that changes in vehicle fuel 
efficiency would be the key to future changes in the 
United States gasoline consumption.
Short-run price elasticities for gasoline and 
other transport fuels are close to zero; this is why the 
2007–2008 surge in the price of oil did not cause an 
immediate collapse in demand. (Many months later, a 
global economic downturn led to lower incomes, oil 
purchases and prices; that downturn was not solely, 
or even primarily, caused by the high price of oil.) 
An increase in oil prices is primarily a burden on 
consumers, and causes only a modest change in short-6 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 53
run oil demand; its longer-term, beneficial effect is 
to accelerate the transition to a more fuel-efficient 
vehicle fleet. 
Any plausible carbon policy would, in the near 
term, raise fossil fuel prices by less than the oil price 
increases of 2007–2008. While such a policy might 
have an important effect on industrial energy use, it 
would presumably have less effect on transportation 
than the recent surge in oil prices. Something more 
needs to be done, to reduce emissions on the scale 
and timetable projected by Stern and others.
IV.  Where do new technologies come 
from?
Market-based incentives such as a carbon price 
are much better at some objectives than others. Price 
signals lead to efficient choices among existing 
alternatives; this is the great success of the market 
economy. On the other hand, as noted in the previous 
section, carbon prices will generally make the dis-
tribution of income and resources more unequal. In 
addition, carbon prices alone will not create the new 
technologies needed to solve the climate crisis. 
The pure theory of competitive markets has 
little to say about technical change. If, as in the text-
book model, all commodities are bought and sold by 
small, competitive firms, and all resources are used 
to produce the maximum possible satisfaction for 
consumers, who has the incentive and the ability to 
invest in research? Yet new technologies do emerge, 
and productivity grows over time. Conventional 
economic models have often addressed this question 
with the ad hoc assumption of a predictable, constant 
rate of technical change, unrelated to investment 
choices or policy decisions. In climate modelling, this 
takes the form of an “autonomous energy efficiency 
improvement” (AEEI) parameter.7 That assumption 
has the unfortunate consequence of biasing results 
toward waiting for new technology to appear: abate-
ment will always be cheaper if it is done later, after 
better technologies have “autonomously” made their 
appearance.
In reality, new technologies do not drop from the 
sky, independent of investments and public policies. 
New technologies are created by conscious effort; 
they often start out expensive and become cheaper 
over time, a process that is often described in terms 
of “learning curves” or “experience curves.” As a 
result, investment in start-up costs can determine 
which technologies are cost-effective in the future. 
Technological change is path-dependent: the current 
suite of available choices depends on past policies 
and actions, just as the available technological op-
tions in the future will depend on our policies and 
actions today.
The learning curve phenomenon is particularly 
important when there is a benefit to standardization; 
in such cases, an early market leader can become 
“locked in,” whether or not it represents the ideal 
technology (as occurred with the Windows operating 
system and other Microsoft software for computers).8 
The current style of industrialization has been referred 
to as “carbon lock-in,” meaning that carbon-intensive 
technologies gained an early lead at a time when 
fossil fuels were cheap and concern about global 
warming was not yet on the horizon (Unruh and 
Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006). Today, the economic ben-
efits of standardization and the low costs of imitating 
and replicating existing technology keep the world 
locked into that same undesirable path.
Research on learning curves has often found that 
as the cumulative total production of a new product 
increases, the unit cost declines at a predictable rate. 
This is measured by the “progress ratio,” defined as 
the change in unit cost per doubling of cumulative 
production. In a historic example from the early twen-
tieth century, Ford’s Model T had a progress ratio of 
85 per cent throughout its long production run: every 
time the cumulative total production of Model Ts 
doubled, the price per car dropped by an average of 
15 per cent (Abernathy and Wayne, 1974).
New energy technologies often display strong 
learning-curve effects. Research on wind power has 
found progress ratios as low as 80 per cent (i.e., cost 
reductions as great as 20 per cent from doubling of 
production) (Junginger et al., 2005). While wind 
power is now competitive in the marketplace under 
many conditions, this success was made possible by 
decades of US and European government investment 
in research and development. Brazilian ethanol pro-
duction, another industry launched by government 
policy, reportedly had a progress ratio of 71 per cent 
from 1985 through 2002 (Goldemberg et al., 2004). 
With technological progress at these rates, it 
is often the case that private enterprises only find it 
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has been buying it and bringing down the price for 
ten or twenty years. Hence the role for public sec-
tor involvement: governments can and must choose 
the new technologies to support, especially when 
– as with climate policy – there is a clear need for 
change. The market alone is not enough; without 
public investment, no credible carbon price would 
do an effective job of launching the crucial new re-
newable and low-carbon technologies. On the other 
hand, with adequate public support, vast changes are 
possible. A plausible model of energy development, 
incorporating learning curves, projects that solar 
photovoltaics, now one of the most expensive ways 
to generate electricity, could be one of the cheapest 
options by 2100 (Rao et al., 2006).
This is not a unique characteristic of new energy 
technologies; rather, it is the norm in technological 
change. The United States Government has funded 
the development of numerous innovative weapon sys-
tems, technologies that would not have automatically 
appeared without government support. Most of them, 
fortunately, have never been used. Along the way, 
many other technologies have been developed, with 
more peaceful applications to civilian life. In the words 
of a history of microelectronics (Morton, 1999), 
The U.S. military initially purchased nearly 
the total production of transistors in the early 
1950’s, using them to make the new generation 
of communications, radar and improved avion-
ics systems, command and control systems, as 
well as for missiles and jet fighters… 
The U.S. government acted as the major market 
for integrated circuits in the early years… In 
1962 … the U.S. government, with extensive 
research interests in space, defense, and other 
areas, purchased virtually 100 per cent of all 
integrated circuits manufactured in the United 
States.
As with wind power, a few decades of generous 
public support were sufficient to launch the micro-
electronics industry as a success in the marketplace. 
And the list goes on and on: computers got their 
start with military purchases; the Internet grew out 
of ARPANET, a Defense Department-sponsored 
network set up in the 1960s to connect military re-
searchers around the country. 
None of these technologies appeared auto-
matically; if the world had waited for autonomous 
technical change or relied on getting the prices 
right, microelectronics might never have happened. 
Instead, the United States Government moved rapidly 
and succeeded in launching a suite of technologies 
that now dominate private markets and shape mod-
ern life. 
V.  carbon markets and developing 
countries
The discussion of learning curves, path depend-
ence, and technological lock-in applies equally to 
climate policy and technologies in developed and 
developing countries. However, the current discourse 
on carbon markets and climate policies has unique 
implications for developing countries, posing obsta-
cles and creating opportunities that are not present in 
higher-income countries.
It has become commonplace to insist on the 
need for a globally harmonized price of carbon. Price 
harmonization is thought to ensure efficiency in the 
worldwide distribution of abatement effort: with 
appropriate market institutions, investment in emis-
sions reduction will flow to the countries (presumably 
developing countries) where the costs of reduction are 
lowest. Fears about the effects of unharmonized car-
bon charges have slowed climate policy initiatives in 
some high-income countries, and have prompted an 
unproductive and potentially protectionist discussion 
of border tariff adjustments. This notion is mistaken 
both in fact and in theory. Empirically, only a handful 
of industries are so carbon-intensive that a difference 
in carbon charges could lead them to move from one 
country to another – and many of them have already 
moved to middle- and low-income countries. 
In theory, remarkably enough, marginal abate-
ment costs do not have to be equal in every country in 
order to achieve economic efficiency. Theorists who 
reach this conclusion generally rely on the unexam-
ined assumption that the world income distribution 
is equitable – or equivalently, that increases in per 
capita consumption are equally urgent everywhere 
(Sheeran, 2006; Chichilnisky and Heal, 1994). In the 
absence of that implausible assumption, it is more 
efficient to carry out higher-cost abatement efforts in 
richer countries. That is, in an inequitable world, ef-
ficiency can be improved by imposing higher carbon 
prices in richer countries. 
It seems unlikely, however, that the enthusiasm 
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dampened by these considerations. Climate analyses 
from the Bretton Woods institutions (see section II), 
among many others, place a priority on establish-
ing a single global carbon market. Thus developing 
countries are likely to face a global carbon price, 
while their local prices for labour, land and other 
inputs remain far below the levels of higher-income 
countries. Carbon emissions, or the credits for avoid-
ing them, will account for a much larger fraction of 
the value of production in lower-income countries. 
The potential dissonance between expensive carbon 
and cheaper local inputs creates both an obstacle and 
an opportunity.
The obstacle is that development may be 
distorted in the direction of activities that yield 
marketable carbon reductions. Even undesirable 
activities may be promoted, such as the expansion of 
the sponge iron industry in India in order to generate 
carbon credits (as cited in section II). Safeguards 
are needed to prevent “carbon-allowance-seeking” 
investments along these lines; in any global carbon 
market, it will be essential to verify that emissions 
are not newly created in order to profit by reducing 
them. The temptation to seek such bogus allowances, 
unfortunately, is a natural consequence of a global 
carbon price in a low-cost local economy.
The positive side of the same pattern of prices 
is that much deeper reductions in carbon emissions 
will be economical in developing countries. In the 
simplest terms, saving a ton of carbon is “worth” 
more hours of labour at a lower wage rate. So there 
may be a category of carbon-saving investments and 
technologies that are profitable only in developing 
countries, where the tradeoff between carbon and 
other inputs is more favourable to emission reduc-
tion. With appropriate public initiatives and financing 
for these technologies, developing countries could 
“leapfrog” beyond the patterns of energy use in 
higher-income countries, establishing a new frontier 
for carbon reduction.
The potential for leapfrogging beyond the cur-
rent technology frontier has been much discussed, 
but is difficult to achieve. The classic example is in 
telephones, where developing countries can now skip 
the expensive development of universal land lines, 
and go directly to cell phones. This is not, however, an 
example of jumping to an entirely new technology; it 
became possible only after cell phones were invented 
and commercialized in developed countries (Unruh 
and Carillo-Hermosilla, 2006). Likewise, research on 
the Chinese auto industry has shown that there is little 
tendency toward leapfrogging beyond international 
standards; in fact, the United States auto companies, 
left to themselves, have often allowed their Chinese 
plants to lag behind their home-country technologies 
(Gallagher, 2006). Stronger Chinese government 
policies and initiatives would be required to achieve 
the potential for newer, cleaner vehicle technologies. 
Even for a developing country with the extensive 
resources and potential of China, there is much that 
needs to be done to reach this new technological 
frontier.
To realize the opportunity created by a global 
carbon price in low-cost economies, there will be a 
need for research and development in appropriate, 
cutting-edge technologies for carbon reduction. As 
with many of the new energy technologies that will 
be needed around the world, decades of public invest-
ment may be required before the developing-country 
technologies are successful in the marketplace. This 
is one more reason why carbon prices are necessary, 
but not sufficient, for an equitable solution to the 
climate crisis.
VI. conclusion
Setting a price for carbon emissions is a valuable 
beginning, but not the end, of climate policy. Much 
more needs to be done to complement the new mar-
kets in carbon emissions, and to ensure an effective 
policy response to the threat of climate change.
Reliance on carbon price increases alone would 
be both ineffective and inequitable. For end uses with 
small price elasticities, such as residential electricity 
and, above all, transportation, a higher fuel price leads 
primarily to a less equal distribution of resources, not 
to a reduction in carbon emissions. Other policies 
are needed to offset the equity impacts of higher fuel 
costs, and to launch the new, low-carbon energy tech-
nologies of the future. Because technology choice is 
path-dependent, with strong learning curve effects, 
public sector initiatives are essential to ensure that the 
global economy follows a climate-friendly path. 
The next international agreement on climate 
policy is likely to move toward a globally harmonized 
carbon price. This creates a unique opportunity for 
developing countries, by making it cost-effective 
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in lower-cost economies. A global carbon price 
will make it profitable for developing countries 
to “leapfrog” beyond the technologies in place in 
higher-income countries. 
Notes
 1  E.g., “Energy-efficiency improvements are unlikely to 
eliminate the need for carbon prices, but they would reduce 
their level” (IMF, 2008, chapter 4: 40).
 2  “Consolidating Efforts to Mobilize and Deliver Finance”, 
“Expanding the Bank’s Role in Developing New Mar-
kets” and “Tapping Private Sector Resources for Climate 
Friendly Development”.
 3  “Scaling Up Operational Approaches to Integrating 
Adaptation and Mitigation in Development Strategies”, 
“Clarifying the Bank’s Role in Accelerating Technology 
Development and Deployment” and “Stepping Up Policy 
Research, Knowledge Management and Capacity Build-
ing”.
 4  Price elasticities are, strictly speaking, negative numbers. 
This discussion follows the common convention of refer-
ring to numbers farther from zero (or larger in absolute 
value) as “larger” elasticities; thus an elasticity of -1 is 
“larger” than an elasticity of -0.5.
 5  See also Reiss and White (2005) estimating a long-run 
price elasticity for California households of -0.39, and 
commenting that high-quality past studies have generally 
yielded estimates between -0.15 and -0.35.
 6  United States EIA (2007) says transportation will account 
for two-thirds of the growth in world oil use through 2030; 
OPEC (2007) data implies that transport will absorb 62 per 
cent of the growth in oil use. 
 7  The model used by the IMF, in the analysis discussed in 
section II above, assumes an AEEI of 0.5 per cent per year 
(IMF, 2008, chapter 4: 46).
 8  The classic references on technological lock-in include 
Paul David (1985) and Brian Arthur (1994).
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